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IN 'THE~ SUPREME C.QUR.T 
of the 
s·rATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT J. BERRY, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs.- Case No. 8786 
LOUIS G. 110ENCH, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On November 1, 1956, Robert J. Berry filed an action 
against Louis G. Moench, M.D., claiming the defendant 
on or about September 12, 1956 wrote a letter to Dr. J. S. 
Hellewell without authority to do so, containing untrue 
and defamatory matter regarding the plaintiff. The 
plaintiff was damaged by the letter. Defendant :filr(l an 
answer admitting the writing of the letter (Exhibit 2), 
denying the statements were defamatory or untrue, and 
setting up affirmative defenses alleging a conditional 
privilege arising from performance of a moral, social, or 
medical duty, together with reasonable cause to believe 
that the statements made were true. Defendant further 
alleged that he acted without malice and set up a further 
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affirmative defense that the statements contained in the 
letter were true. The case was pretried before the Honor-
able A. H. Ellett, one of the Judges of the Third Judicial 
District on the 5th day of September, 1957. The Court 
made certain findings of fact and rulings of law (R. 5-7), 
including a ruling as a matter of law that the defendant 
had a conditional privilege when he wrote and published 
pretrial Exhibit 2. Plaintiff moved to amend the pretrial 
findings regarding conditional privilege. The matter was 
heard before Judge Ellett September 19, 1957 (R. 8), 
and the pretrial order as made \Y.as allowed to stand. 
Trial came on before the Honorable Ray \Tan Cott, 
Jr., ~itting 'vith jury on October 9, 1957. Prior to select-
ing the jury, plaintiff again moved to amend the pretrial 
order 'vith regard to conditional privilege and the plain-
tiff's motion \\'"as denied. ..A .. jury was selected, testimony 
\\·as adduced on behalf of both parties. 
Omitting stock instructions, the jury was instructed 
hy the court as follows: 
.. ln~truction Xo. 1: You are instructed that 
the plaintiff by his eon1plaint alleged that the de-
fendant is a Doctor of ~Iedicine specializing in 
p~ychiatry in ~alt Lake c~ounty .. litah. That in the 
yPn r 1 n4-n the plaintiff rereiYed professional care 
frotn t]H\ defendnnt: that on the 12th day of Sep-
tPtnhPl\ 1 ~l;)t). the defendant .Jroencl1 forwarded to 
Dr .• T. ~- flelle"·t-.II of EYnnston. ,,~~~onring. a letter 
"·ith rPft\n\nc( .. tn the plaintiff .. "~hirh "-ras further 
<'Pilllnunicn t-ed In~ said Dr. Hell ewell to Mr. and 
~I r~. ,J. 'rillinn1~ of tht\ sa1ne city. That the plain-
t i f'f nllt\g-<'~ thn t said lett<.~ I". \rhich l1as been intro-
du('(\d i;1 t\YidPJH'P in this case and is Inarked Ex-
ltihit ;2 ht\rPin~ contnined eertain def.a1natory state-
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ments in reference to the plaintiff and that as a 
result of said defamation the plaintiff has received 
damage in character and reputation in general 
damages in the sum of $25,000.00. 
"Plaintiff further alleges that said statements 
of the defendant were made with malice and as .a 
consequence thereof he is entitled to punitive dam-
ages in the sum of $25,000.00. Plaintiff further 
alleges that the statements that are claimed by him 
to be defamatory are untrue. 
"To the plaintiff's complaint the defendant 
has filed his answer wherein he sets forth and ad-
mits that the letter, Exhibit No. 2, was sent by him 
in the performance of a moral, social and medic.al 
duty. 
"The above and foregoing is a summarized 
statement of the plaintiffs's complaint and de-
fendant's answer, insofar as it is applicable in 
these instructions up to this point. 
"You are further instructed that the defend·-
ant in the making of the statements as contained 
in Exhibit No. 2 by virtue of his position and rela-
tionship to the plaintiff and Dr. Hellewell was, as 
"- a matter of law, entitled to make the same because 
of his qualified privilege, and that for the making 
of such statements the defendant is not liable to 
the plaintiff unless the plaintiff proves by a pre .. 
ponderance of the evidence the following matters 
which now constitute the elements of his cause of 
action against the defendant. 
"You are instructed, however, that if the 
plaintiff proves by a preponderance of the evi-
dence the following elements then and in that 
event he would be entitled to recover." ( l~. 138-139) 
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"Instruction No. 2: You are instructed that 
the elements of the plaintiff's cause of action as 
it now stands are as follows : 
"1. That the Exhibit 2 contains one or more 
statements that are defamatory to the plaintiff 
as that term will be hereinafter defined to you: 
"2. That one or more of said defamatory 
statements as contained in Exhibit 2 was made 
by the defendant about the plaintiff with actual 
malice as that term will be hereinafter defined to 
you: 
"3. That as a pTo:ximate result of said de-
famatory statement, or statements, the plaintiff 
suffered damages, and their value in money. 
"You are instructed that in the event the 
plaintiff fails in his proof by a preponderance of 
the evidence of any one, or more, of the three ele-
ments that go to constitute his cause of action, 
as heretofore mentioned, that in th.at event the 
issues should be found in favor of the defendant 
and against the plaintiff. 
"The defendant's defenses that you "ill eon-
sider in this matter are two in nun1ber. The first 
one is that the statements contained in Exhibit No. 
2 are not, nor is .any of then1, defrunatory. Seeond-
ly, that if any statement, or statements, contained 
in Exhibit 2 are found by the jury to be defan1a-
tory the defendant alleges that such statements 
are true. 
"You are instructed that the burden of proof 
is upon the defendant to prove by a. preponder-
ance of the evidence one or more of his defenses 
as heretofore 1nentioned and ~~ou are instructed 
that in the event you find fro1n all of the evidence 
that any one, or more, of said two defenses haYe 
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been proven by a preponderance of the evidence 
that they, or it, would be a complete bar to the 
right of the plaintiff to recover herein .and your 
verdict in that instance should be in favor of the 
defendant and against the plaintiff, no cause of 
action. 
"You are instructed that where a litigant has 
the burden of proving a matter in issue by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that such litigant does 
not sustain that burden if the evidence is equally 
balanced between him and his opponent, or pre-
ponderates in favor of his opponent." (R. 139-140) 
"Instruction l~ o. 3 : You are instructed that 
Dr. :Nioench in the publication and sending of the 
letter, Exhibit 2, as h.as heretofore been mentioned, 
was entitled under the law to do so by virtue of 
the fact that he had a qualified privilege so to do 
and you are instructed that before that qualified 
privilege can be overco1ne, or destroyed, the plain-
tiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence 
that the defendant's action in so doing was 
prompted by actual malice. You are instructed 
that this kind of malice which overcomes and de-
stroys the qualified privilege has been defined to 
mean the following kind of action; namely, that 
the .acts of the defendant Moench were done with 
spite, ill will or hatred towards the plaintiff and 
with a wicked motive which induced the defendant 
to defame the plaintiff." (R. 140-141) 
"Instruction No. 5 : In determining whethe~' 
or not the letter by Dr. Moench was defamatory, 
as that term is used in our law, you are instructed 
that you should consider the component parts of 
the letter, .as well as the letter in its entirety. 
"Under the law, if the letter contains state-
rnen ts of fact, and if you determine that such 
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facts were true as of the date of the letter, then 
you should consider whether there are additional 
statements, either of fact, or of opinion. If, after 
such determination, you find that such ,additional 
statements of fact were reasonable inferences from 
the true facts, and if you further find that the 
statements of opinion were based upon Dr. 
Moench's professional interpretation of the facts, 
then he is not liable." (R. 141) 
"Instruction No. 9 : You .are instructed that 
the letter itself and the statements therein con-
tained are not evidence or proof of 'actual malice' 
and in order to prove 'actual malice' plaintiff must 
produce evidence apart from the letter proving 
that Dr. Moench wrote the letter because of spite, 
ill will, or hatred ,apart from the letter or the 
statements contained therein, your verdict must 
be in favor of Dr. Moench and against plaintiff, 
'no cause of action'." (R. 143-144) 
"Instruction No. 10: In determining whether 
Dr. Moench wrote the letter of September 12, 
1956 with malice, you should consider, among 
other things, whether Dr. Moench had probable 
cause to believe that the statements he n1ade in 
the letter were true. 
"This is because, under the law, the presence 
of probable cause is evidence of good faith and 
of the absence of 1nalice." (R. 144) 
"Instruction No. 11 : You are instructed that 
if, after a consideration of the evidence in this 
case, you find that Dr. l\Ioench acted as a reason-
ably prudent Doctor of Psychiatry in obtaining 
a medical history of plaintiff fro1n sourees reason-
ably available, even though some of the infornla-
tion obtained was hearsay or the .actual truth 
thereof not known, and that the letter was 'vritten 
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under the reasonable belief and in good faith tb:-~_t 
the statements were correct, then you are in-
structed that it makes no difference whether or 
not the statements can now be shown to be in-
correct. 
"Therefore, if you find from the evidence in 
this case that Dr. Moench did reasonably believe 
the statements to be correct, your verdict must he 
in favor of Dr. Moench and against plaintiff, no 
cause of action, \Vhether such statements were cor-
rect or incorrect, unless plaintiff proves by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that such statements 
were made because of 'actual malice' against plain-
tiff." (R. 144) 
"Instruction No. 12 : As a summary of some 
of the instructions herein, but not all inclusive or 
exclusive of the other instructions, you are in-
structed that to find for the plaintiff the following 
must be found by you to be the f.acts in accordance 
with the burden of proof mentioned. 
"1. That the matters are defamatory. 
"2. That they are untrue if defamatory.· 
"3. That the defamation was made by the 
defendant of the plaintiff with actual malice. 
"4. That plaintiff sustained damage. 
"To find for the defendant you must find in 
accordance with the burdens of proof mentioned 
the following facts. 
"1. That there was no actual malice by the 
defendant towards the plaintiff at the time of 
making the statements, or, 
"2. That none of the statements in Exhibit 2 
arc~ defamatory, or, 
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"3. That all defamatory statements made by 
the defendant of the plaintiff were true, or, 
"4. That plaintiff has sustained no damage.'' 
(R. 144-145) 
The plaintiff excepted to all the foregoing instructions, 
and in addition, excepted to the court's refusal to give 
plaintiff's requested instructions No. 4, 5, 6, 7, 7 -A and 
8. 
The case was argued and submitted to the jury. The 
jury returned a verdict of no cause of action. Plaintiff 
moved for .a new trial on the grounds of the court's ruling 
on conditional privilege as a matter of law and the court's 
instructions regarding conditional privilege and requiring 
and defining actual malice. The motion ,,~as denied by 
the court and the plaintiff filed notice of .appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The p·arties are referred to as in the trial court. On 
September 12, 1956, the defendant, Louis G. ::Jfoench, Doc-
tor of Medicine specializing in psychiatry at the Salt 
Lake Clinic in Salt Lake City, Utah, since 19±4, \\·Tote a 
letter (R. 5, P. 3) to J. S. Helle\vell, ~I.D., .a physician 
practicing in Evanston, Wyon1ing (R. 6, P. 7). The letter 
was in response to a request of J.S. Helle\vell (Exhibit 
1) which read as follows: 
'
4 Dear Doctor Helle\vell: 
"Since I don't have his authorization, the pa-
tient you 1nentioned in your last letter \\rill remain 
nameless, but: 
"He was treated here in 1949 .as an e1nergenry. 
Our diagnosis was ~fanic depressiYe depression 
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in a psychopathic personality. This is an unusual 
combination, and in retrospect, the psychopathic 
personality was the major problem. He had one 
brother as a manic, and his father committed 
suicide. The patient was attempting to go thru 
school on the GI bill when we saw him. Instead 
of attending class he would spend most of the days 
.and nights playing cards for money. Because of 
family circumstances, we treated him for a mere 
token charge (and I notice even that has never 
been paid). During his care here, he purchased 
a brand new Packard, -vvithout even money to buy 
gasoline. 
"Ever since he was a small boy, he has been 
able to get away v1ith things. He has always been 
in trouble and someone has always rescued him. 
He has not .assumed responsibility. He was in 
constant trouble with the authorities during the 
war, left a number of jobs, did not do well in 
school, and never did really support his wife and 
children. 
"Since he was here, we have had repeated 
requests for abstracts of his record, indicating 
repeated trouble. Our last request awhile back 
was from the Colorado State Hospital. 
"My suggestion to the infatuated girl would 
be to run as fast .and as far as she possibly could, 
in any direction away frorn him. I doubt she will 
follow any such suggestions until she has had 4 or 
5 years of married hell. It is terribly unfortunate 
that psychopaths are so .attractive to women, and 
get women emotionally entangled with them, and 
almost immediately in any relationship get the girl 
to feel like taking on a crusade of s.aving the poor, 
misunderstood person ('only you can straighten 
me out!'). Of course, if he doesn't marry her, he 
will marry someone else and make life hell for 
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that person. The usual story is repeated un-
successful marriages and a trail of t:vagedy behind. 
"Yours very truly 
"Louis G. Moench, M.D. 
At the time of writing the letter, the plaintiff was 
not a patient of Dr. Moench. The defendant had not seen, 
nor had contact with the plaintiff for a period of approxi-
mately seven ye.ars. The defendant's sole contacts with 
the plaintiff had been on and following September 24, 
1949. On that date, plaintiff Berry visited Dr. nfoench 
at the request of Ethella Berry, who was then his wife, 
concerning certain marital difficulties bet\veen plaintiff 
and Ethella. Ethella previously talked to a Dr. Miller (R. 
5-6) at the Salt Lake Clinic, as had her sister, both giv-
ing purported information about the plaintiff on which 
part of the clinical record was based. Plaintiff had an 
interview with the defendant on that date for a period of 
between thirty minutes and one hour, a portion of which 
time Ethella Berry and Dr. ~!iller were present. The 
defendant was unable to remember which p.art of the 
history he had gained fron1 Dr. ~filler's notes, \vhich part 
from Ethella Berry, and 'vhich part from the defendant 
(R. 22-28, inclusive). Thereafter, the plaintiff took four 
shock treatments, the last being on October 1, 1949. 
Though further treatments were advised by defendant, 
they were then discontinued by plaintiff (R. 15-16). 
With respect to the statements 1nade in the letter set 
forth supra, plaintiff admits that his father committed 
suicide, but denies every other allegation contained in 
the letter. The defendant admitted by a letter written at 
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the request of the plaintiff on September 17, 1956 (R. 3) 
that very little medical history w.as furnished by Mr. 
Berry, most having been volunteered by his wife. The 
clinic had no v1ay of verifying the information (R. 3). 
Though the defendant had not seen the plaintiff for a 
period of seven years, and was aware that he did not 
have the plaintiff's authorization (see paragraph 1 of 
Exhibit 2)-"Dear Dr. Hellewell: Since I don't have his 
authorization, the patient you mentioned in your last 
letter will remain nameless, but-", the doctor saw fit to 
give advice regarding the patient's condition at the 
present time (see last p.aragraph of Exhibit 2). The 
doctor further slandered the pLaintiff's credit (Exhibit 
2)-"Because of family circumstances, we treated him for 
a 1nere token charge (and I notice even that has never 
been paid)'', though he admitted at the trial that .all the 
bill, with the exception of $5.00, had been paid (R. 25), 
and the doctor had no interest in the patient at the time 
of writing the letter. 
The defendant had no interest in and did not even 
know Dr. I-Iellewell's patient, J. Williams, for whom the 
information w.as asked, nor Williams' daughter, Mary 
Boothe (R. 34). At the time of the writing of the letter 
(Exhibit 2), plaintiff was divorced from Ethella Berry, 
was 37 years of age, the father of two children, and was 
living alone in Salt Lake City. He was keeping company 
with Mary Boothe, daughter of Mr . .and Mrs. J. Williams 
of Evanston, Wyoming, who was later married to the 
plaintiff in December 1956 (R. 89). Mary Boothe was a 
woman 37 years of age and had a 13-year-old son, Steven 
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(R. 89); she had lived away from her parents for various 
p·eriods. She h:ad met the plaintiff more than a year be-
fore the letter was written; had been going with him 
rather regularly for some time. Plaintiff had met !1r. 
and Mrs. J. Willia1ns but at the time of the letter plain-
tiff and Mary Boothe had made no definite marriage 
plans. 
With regard to the truth or falsity of the statements 
contained in the letter, defendant could not remember 
from whom the information had been gained, stating both 
on the stand and in Exhibit 3 that :ilir. Berry furnished 
very little medical history, and most of the history was 
furnished by his wife and not verified. He did not know 
the name of plaintiff's brother or the state of the plain-
tiff's financial condition at the time he alleged (Exhibit 
2), " ... he purchased a brand new Packard, ''ithout even 
money to buy gasoline", the plaintiff having purchased 
the automobile with money received through an inherit-
ance (R. 57). The only evidence regarding the plaintiff's 
progress and success in school indicates that his studies 
were always above the average (R. 57-59, inclusive). 
The only basis of any troubles as .a s1nall boy \vas hearsay 
to the doctor from the for1ner l\Irs. Berry, \Yith the excep-
tion of his ad1nission that he once stole a chicken (R. 62). 
I-Ie was involved in an incident regarding tl1e black nlar-
keting of cigarettes \vhile in .£_t\.frica during \\T orld \\' ar II, 
but came back and worked for the san1e con1p.any in the 
United States (R. 62), this being the only evidence sup-
porting Dr. Moench's staten1ent that he \vas in constant 
trouble \vith the- authorities during the \var. There is no 
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evidence regarding his failure to support his wife and 
children (Exhibit 2). Dr. Hell ewell in his letter (Exhibit 
1) asked only for " ... a brief resume of his condition and 
your impressions of the man," .and the doctor in his reply 
gave not only a series of unsupported, purportedly factual 
staten1ents, but his suggestions as to ho'v Dr. Hellewell 
should proceed to advise 'vith regard to a forthcoming 
marriage of a person who was not Dr. Hellewell's patient, 
but a daughter of Dr. Hellewell's p.atient (Exhibit 2). 
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR 
The plaintiff assigns the following errors : 
1. The pretrial court and the trial court e-rred in 
holding that there was a conditional privilege as a matter 
of law. 
2. The trial court erred in instructing the jury re-
garding .actual malice in Instructions 2, 11, 12, and in 
failing to give plaintiff's requested Instruction 2 as to 
actual malice. 
3. The court erred in giving Instruction No. 10 on 
probable cause and reason to believe, and failure to give 
plaintiff's requested Instruction No. 7 -A, on the basis 
of reasonable diligence ,and the reasonable n1an test. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE PRETRIAL COURT AND THE TRIAL COURT 
ERRED IN H~OLDING THERE WAS A ·CONDITIONAL PRIVI-
LEGE AS A MATTER OF LAW. (.A.ssignment No.1). 
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The defendant, Louis G. Moench, at the time of his 
communication (Exhibit 2), had no present interest in 
the defendant, Robert J. Berry. His only interest in 
Mary Boothe, Berry's present wife, was at that time an 
acquaintance of Dr. J. S. Hellewell, who had as patients 
Mr. and Mrs. J. S. Williams who are the father and 
mother of Mary Boothe, a 37 year old, previously 1narried 
mother. The defendant wrote the letter claimed to be 
libelous under full knowledge that he was without authori-
zation. He knew .at the time that he had not seen nor had 
communication with the subject of the letter, the plaintiff, 
for a period of seven years. Defendant did not know the 
plaintiff's present condition; having testified that since 
he had treated the plaintiff, he had treated some 800 
persons with a similar diagnosis and that he had improved 
or cured a majority of them to the point where they were 
making a success of marriage (R. 53-54). By his own 
admission, the defendant's statements as to the unknown 
brother being a manic, the financial situation \Yith regard 
to the bill for the doctor's treatment, the statement as to 
the plaintiff's trouble as a small boy and during the war, 
and as to plaintiff's record in school were based on hear-
say from a wife who, as the doctor was a\\ ... are, was coming 
to the Salt Lake Clinic due to troubles \Yith her marriage. 
All the statements were without a reasonable basis for 
belief and referred to a tin1e seven years past. The facts, 
as set forth in the letters the1nselves and in the evidence 
produced in the court, do not show any interest in the 
doctor, the publisher of the letter, such as to give condi-
tional privilege to publish defamatory matter under our 
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present statutes or the rulings by our Supreme Court. 
There appear to be no late cases regarding a privi-
lege in infor1ning a person with regard to character or 
background of a lover or suitor, but the courts have ruled 
on the problem as far back as 1858 when the Supreme 
Court of Massachusetts in Krebs v. Oliver, 78 Mass. 12 
Gray 239, stated -
"Statements that a man has been imprisoned 
for larceny 1nade to the family of a woman who 
is about to marry, by one who is no relation of 
either, and not in answer to inquiries, are not 
privileged communications." 
Also, the same Court in 1862, J a annes v. Bennett, 87 Mass. 
5 Allen, 169; 81 Am. Dec. 738, stated-
"A letter to .a woman containing libelous mat-
ter concerning her suitor cannot be justified on 
the ground that the writer was her friend and 
former pastor, and that the letter was written at 
the request of her parents who assented to all its 
contents." 
In the Supreme Court of New York in 1888 in the case of 
Byam v. Coll1Jns, 111 N.Y. 143; 19 N.E. 75; 7 Am. St. Rep. 
726; 2 L.R.A. 129, the Court stated -
"A libelous letter concerning the suitor of 
the person addressed, not written .at the latter's 
request but apparently at the instance of common 
friends, to prevent a marriage, is not privileged 
by reason of previous friendships nor by reason 
of a request made four years before the acquaint-
ance of the suitor was made for information of 
anything known to the writer concerning any 
young man addressed the writer went with or 
any young man in ,the case.'' 
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True, our statute sets forth the conditions under which 
libelous matter may be conditionally privileged, and the 
Court in these fairly recent cases, I-Iales v. The Bank of 
SpaniJsh Fork, ______ Utah ______ , 197 P. (2d) 910, and Coombs 
v. Montgomery Ward & Co., ______ Utah ______ , 228 P. (2d) 275, 
discussed these cases. The Hales case was a case involv-
ing the person suspected of cashing a forged instrument, 
and the hank and employees of the bank which cashed the 
instrument were financially injured. The Coombs case 
involved an employee-employer relationship. Quoting 
from the Coombs case at page 277, the Court stated -
"An occasion is conditionally privileged when 
circumstances induce a correct, reasonable belief 
that (.a) facts exist which affect a sufficiently 
important interest of the publisher, and (b) the 
recipient's knowledge of the defamatory matter 
will be of service in the lawful protection of the 
~nterest." (Emphasis added.) 
the interest referred to being set forth by that case as the 
interest of the publisher. Where, in the above case, is the 
interest of the defendant, Dr. ~foench, which requires la-\Y-
ful protection~ Quoting further fron1 the Coo1ubs case-
" The st.a tement Inust be in protection of the 
interest or the performance of the duty. There 
must also be an honest belief in the truth of the 
stateinent." 
Though the doctor defendant clain1s a duty in his answer 
and in his testi1nony, it is a private rather than a public 
duty and an alleged dut~~ to persons, to-"~it, :Jir. ,and :1\Irs. 
J. Willia1ns and their daughter, ~lary Boothe, "~hon1 the 
doctor did not even kno\\' at the tin1e of the publishing. 
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The present case must be differentiated from Williams 
v. Standard Examtner Publishtng Co., 83 Utah 31, 27 
P. ( 2d) 1, on the basis that that case concerns a public 
interest arising from the actions of a public official con-
cerning the water supply for an entire city. The Coombs 
case quoted supra, also stated at page 225 -
and, 
"As indicated in the foregoing quotation, it 
must be for the purpose of safeguarding the in-
terest,'' 
". . . must also be ,a proper interest on the 
part of the one to whom the inquiry is made." 
Again, we ask; where is the interest or duty of the defend-
ant, Dr. Moench, with regard to the \Villiamses and their 
daughter, Mary Boothe, who were unknown to the pub-
lisher ( R. 34). 
The other basis for the conditional privilege is a 
reasonable belief in the truth of the statements made. 
The defendant admits through all his testimony and in 
the letter to Mr. and Mrs. J. Williams (Exhibit 3), that 
little of the medical history came from the defendant, 
most of it having been furnished by the wife and wife's 
sister to Dr. Miller (R. 26-34, inclusive). 
vVith regard to reasonable belief, the one place where 
the doctor could have checked his statement without ef-
fort was with regard to the phrase in Exhibit 2, "Because 
of family circumstances, we treated him for a mere token 
charge (and I notice even that has never been paid)." 
The records of payments by the plaintiff were kept at the 
clinic where the doctor worked and the doctor testified 
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at the trial that all charges, with the exception of $5.00, 
had been paid (R. 24-25). 
The record shows no proper interest in Dr. Moench 
which should have been protected or w.as in any way 
protected by his publication to Dr. Hellewell a statement 
for the use of Hellewell's patient, J. Vvilliams; and fur-
ther shows no basis of reasonable belief that the state-
ments made were true. In fact, Exhibit 2 goes far beyond 
the inquiry by Dr. Hellewell's letter (Exhibit 1). The 
statements in Exhibit 2 purport to be statements of 
presently existing f.acts rather than conclusions based on 
hearsay information derived some seven years ago. Fur-
ther, the doctor testified himself that persons with the 
medical diagnosis he had given the plaintiff and published 
to Hellewell were subject to cure to the point where the 
patient could have a happy marriage. The doctor stated 
that he had treated some 800 patients with this primary 
diagnosis since he had seen the plaintiff, and he had been 
able to effect cures in the majority of those 800 patients 
to the point where they "\vere making a success of their 
marriages (R. 53-54). 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING THE 
JURY REGARDING ACTUAL MALICE IN INSTRUCTIONS 
2, 11, 12, AND IN FAILING TO GIVE PLAINTIFF'S RE-
QUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 2 AS TO ACTUAL MALICE. 
(~Assignment No. 2) 
Due to the Court's ruling that a conditional privilege 
existed as a n1atter of la,v. and that the eonditional 
privilege 1nust be overcome or destroyed, the Court found 
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it necessary at sever.al places in the instructions to 
comment "One or more defamatory statements as con-
tained in Exhibit 2 was made by the defendant about 
the plaintiff vvith actual malice as that term w~ll be here-
~nafter deftned." The Court referred to actual malice in 
paragraph 2 of Instruction No. 2, Instruction Nos. 3, 9, 
10, 11, and Instruction No. 12, subparagraph 3 (see in-
structions set forth in the statement of the case supra). 
The law is uncontested that in the absence of 
privilege, either absolute or conditional, malice is inferred 
from proof of the defamatory nature of a written state-
ment. Therefore, we contend that the Court, as a con-
dition of its error in ruling that there was a conditional 
privilege, also erred in all its instructions to the jury 
wherein a finding of actual malice was a prerequisite 
to a verdict for the plaintiff. 
Even though there be no error in the Court's ruling 
of conditional privilege, it is the plaintiff's contention 
that the Court erred in defining actual malice in its 
Instruction No. 9 on the basis that it is not necessary 
to produce evidence apart from the publication proving 
that the defendant wrote the letter because of spite, ill 
will or hatred, .apart from the letter or the statements 
contained therein (R. 143, Instruction No. 9), plaintiff 
contending that the publication itself, without further 
evidence, may show the malice of the publisher; for 
example, the defendant in publishing the letter starts 
out by recognizing the impropriety of a person in his 
profession releasing confidential information concerning 
a former patient without the patient's permission when 
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he states, "Since I don't have his authorization, the pa-
tient you mentioned in your last letter will remain name-
less, but:" - the doctor having a state of mind at that 
time showing knowledge that the release of the informa-
tion from the balance of the letter (Exhibit 2), and the 
reasonable belief in the truth thereof were such that he 
feared to put the former patient's name in the letter. 
Secondly, he made a statement as to the defendant's 
credit, stating that he had not been paid even the token 
charge, while the books of the clinic, by the doctor's 
own testimony, showed that $45.00 of a $50.00 bill had 
been paid. Third, the doctor in the last paragraph of 
the letter (Exhibit 2) seeks to advise another doctor 
as to what to suggest to an infatuated girl, a woman 
of 37 .and unknown to him, in her relations to a man 
whom the doctor had not seen for seven years, setting 
forth in no uncertain terms his idea of the consequences 
of the marriage between the two persons. 
Though we are aware that the Coombs case quoted 
supra sets forth the language used in the Judge's In-
struction No. 9 in this case, the facts are different, this 
case showing the doctor's own recommendations as to 
what to tell an "infatuated girl" and showing the doctor's 
intent to attempt to prevent a marriage bet\Yeen a. girl 
unknown to him and a for1ner patient of seYen years 
ago .and about 'vhose condition he presently kne"T nothing. 
The malice may be inferred fron1 the paragraphs in the 
letter heretofore discussed and also by the letter as a 
whole. 
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With reference to the above reasoning, the following 
cases: Warren v. PurliJtzer Publish~ng Co., 78 S.W. (2d) 
404- Missouri; Cook v. Purlitzer Publishing Co., 241 Mo. 
326, 145 S.W. 480- 492; Boehm v. Western Leather and 
Cloth Co., 161 S.W. (2d) 710- Missouri, state-
"Proof of falsity of f.acts and knowledge of 
such falsity is proof of actual malice in a libelous 
action." 
In the instant case, the records of payment to the Salt 
Lake Clinic by the plaintiff were available to the defend-
ant; yet, he made the above statement concerning plain-
tiff's payment. The Cook case supra, holds at page 491 
that, 
"Proof that the charge is false destroys the 
Privilege." 
In Stevenson v. Morris, 288 Pa. 405, 136 A. 234, 50 A.L.R. 
335, it was stated at page 235 of the Atlantic citation, 
"To claim the benefit of privilege and absolve 
himself from suspicion of being actuated by mali-
cious motives, defendant was bound to use reason-
able effort to ascertain the truth of charges of 
competency directed against the person engaged 
in the work and to refrain from the use of inflam-
matory and exaggerated statements." 
In all of the above cases it appears that even if there 
were privilege, the publication itself, by going too far 
or by being combined with evidence failing to show a 
reasonable investigation as to the truth of the facts, 
destroys the privilege in the inferences of malice that 
arises without a showing of spite, ill will, or hatred, 
apart from the letter or statements contained therein. 
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The jury in the instant case, due to the Court's 
repeated references to actual malice and the Court's 
erroneous definition of actual malice (Instruction No.9), 
even though they found the statements or part of them 
to be wholly untrue or to be defamrutory, would be 
unable to make a finding for the plaintiff under the 
Court's exclusive definition of actual malice, and Instruc-
tion No. 9 together with the repeated reference to actual 
malice throughout the instructions, in fact, constituted 
a directed verdict of no cause of action. 
In addition to the above discussion and cases, the 
Court's repetition of the words, "actual malice," and 
the necessity of the showing that overcomes that actual 
malice, were unduly emphasized by its multiple use in the 
instructions set forth above, and, therefore, highly pre-
judicial to the plaintiff. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT ERRED IN GIVING INSTRUCTION NO. 
10 ON PROBABLE CAUSE AND REASON TO BELIEVE, 
AND FAILURE TO GIVE PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED IN-
STRUCTION NO. 7-A, ON THE BASIS OF REASONABLE 
DILIGEN·CE AND THE REASONABLE PRUDENT MAN 
TEST. (Assignment No.3) 
Defendant excepted to the Court's Instruction X o. 
10 with regard to conditional privilege, and in conjunc-
tion therewith, excepted to the Court's refusal to give 
plaintiff's Instruction No. 11 regarding the showing of 
actual rnalice fron1 a 'Yillful or intentional act causing 
injury without just cause, although not sho,ving hatred 
or spite as set forth in the Courfs Instruction X o. 9. 
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As discussed in Points I and II above, there can 
be no doubt of the context and tone of the letter (Exhibit 
2) written by Dr. Moench to Dr. Hellewell that (a) his 
intent was to advise the unknown girl, daughter of 
Hellewell's p.atient Williams, not to marry the plaintiff 
Berry; (b) the intent of the letter by its own terms and 
statements of fact, or we should say "purported facts," 
rather than merely diagnosis and impressions as re-
quested by Dr. Hellewell, was with the intent on the 
part of the defendant to paint the character of the 
plaintiff .as black as possible to influence the unknown 
girl. The Court states in Instruction No. 10, 
". . . must consider, among other things, 
whether Dr. 11oench had probable cause to believe 
that the statements he made in the letter were 
true. 
"This is becauS'e under the law the presence 
of probable cause is evidence of good faith and of 
the absence of malice.'' 
In conjunction with Instruction 10, the Court instructs 
in Instruction No. 11 regarding probable cause: 
"You are instructed that if, after a considera-
tion of the evidence in this case, you find that 
Dr. Moench acted as a reasonable prudent Doctor 
of Psychiatry in obtaining a medical history of 
plaintiff from sources reasonably available, even 
though some of the information obtained was 
hearsay or the actual truth thereof not kno-vvn, 
and that the letter was written under the reason-
able belief and in good faith that the statements 
were correct, then you are instructed that it makes 
no difference whether or not the statements can 
now be shown to be incorrect. 
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"Therefore, if you find from the evidence in 
this case that Dr. Moench did reasonably believe 
the statements to be correct, your verdict must 
be in favor of Dr. Moench and against plaintiff, 
no cause of action, whether such statements were 
correct or incorrect, unless plaintiff proves by a 
preponderance of the evidence that such state-
ments were made because of 'actual malice' against 
plaintiff.'' 
In giving Instruction No. 11 (statement of the case 
supra), the Court required only that the jury determine 
with regard to reasonable belief the test of a reasonable 
prudent doctor of psychiatry's basis of belief. The Court 
gave no instruction regarding the test for determining 
that belief, nor did it give the test of the reasonable 
prudent man as is normally set forth by the Court, 
allowing the jury to use themselves .and their acquaint-
ances as a measure or guide. 
The affirmative language of Instruction :?:-~ o. 11 
leaves the doctor's own staten1ents as to Iris good faith 
the only test for the jury's belief or disbelief as to good 
faith, regardless of the fact that those state1nents are 
self-serving. The Court refused plaintiff's requested in-
structions regarding reasonable belief and plaintiff's 
requested Instruction No. 7 -A "~ith regard to the basis 
of determining reasonable belief or reasonable c.au8e. 
The only evidence in the record regarding re.asonable 
basis for belief \Yas the state1nent of Dr. ~Ioench and 
that of Dr. Nelson regarding obtaining of infor1nation 
in psyehiatrie ea~P~ - and the Court \Yill note that Dr. 
Nelson took gren t rnre to secure thP consent of the plain-
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concerning the plaintiff (R. 117-122). 
CONCLUSION 
The law in this country since the time of the Consti-
tution and the Bill of Rights has been based upon the 
maxim that "where there is a wrong the law or equity 
will furnish a remedy." In this case, there is no question 
that the defendant released information which he had 
made no attempt to verify, though for at least a portion 
of the information, proof of its verification was at his 
finger tips, to-wit: The records of the Salt Lake Clinic 
where he worked, which would have given him the status 
of the plaintiff's account. The doctor blithely released 
defamatory information per se with, we repeat, no effort 
to verify the truth or falsity of the information con-
cerning plaintiff, his habits, his family life, his relatives, 
his credit, his grades in school, and all based on hearsay 
information received a period of seven years prior to the 
publication of the defamatory matter. 
In making the above statement, we ignore the de-
fendant's duty .arising from the confidential relationship 
between doctor and patient which would prevent the 
extraction of confidences even under oath in a court 
of law. Yet, the defendant did release the information, 
not in accordance with a request made to him for infor-
mation, but by going far over and beyond the information 
requested in setting forth unverified statements as fact. 
The entire letter (Exhibit 2) was a willing, intenti!onal 
setting forth of libelous statements, and further shows 
that they were set forth with the intent to do harm to 
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the plaintiff by attempting to forestall or prevent his, 
the plaintiff's, marriage to a person unknown to the 
p·ublisher and in whom he had no interest. 
We contend that under the statutes of this state 
regarding libel and conditional privilege, and in cases 
where this Court has ruled on such privilege, the entire 
record in the instant case fails to show an interest in 
the defendant requiring protection which might give rise 
to a conditional privilege. The record also fails to show 
any moral, social, or medical duty giving rise to a con-
ditional p-rivilege. 
Dr. ~ioench took statements from a seven-year-old 
record, which to his knowledge was compiled from the 
statements of at least three persons, the plaintiff, Ethella 
Berry, and Ethella Berry's sister. The doctor .also kne'v 
at the time of writing that the statements made by Mrs. 
Berry and her sister were made during a period replete 
"\vith marital difficulties between the plaintiff and his 
former wife. Yet, the doctor published~ in a letter to 
another doctor, the context of those state1nents as f.act, 
with the only inference arising fron1 the tone of the 
letter being that he knew the information would be re-
leased as fact to the patient of Dr. Helle,Yell and trans-
mitted by the patient to the patient's daughter. 
The doctor also realized th.at he had no right or 
authority to release the inforn1ation, as is evidenced by 
the first sentence of his letter. Yet he claimed, and the 
Court instructed, that he had a privilege to release the 
infor1nation because he felt that there \Yas a 1nor.al, social 
and 1nedical duty. l-Ias the pO\\'"er of the n1edical profes-
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sion in this country reached a point where doctors may 
release to the world not only secrets given to them in 
confidance for furtherance of treatment, but hears.ay 
information derived from other persons and defamatory 
in itself, and then claim a privilege giving them an im-
punity from consequences arising from the defam.atory 
nature of the statements .and untruths contained in un-
verified statements on their own contention that they 
feel it their medical duty, not to the public, not to a 
group, but to some person or persons unknown to them. 
Dr. Moench's own admission was that he knew nothing 
of Dr. Hellewell's patient outside of Dr. Hellewell's 
brief letter (Exhibit 1). Yet, he answered, not giving 
the requested medical diagnosis nor impressions, but 
giving as fact untrue and defamatory statements together 
with unsolicited advice to the unknown person three re-
lationships removed from the defendant. 
We think this is neither the word nor the spirit of 
the law nor the intent of the legislature in drafting and 
passing statutes in this state regarding conditional privil-
eges, nor of the cases ruled on by the court. There is 
no question th.at the statutes from the libel cases, includ-
ing the Coombs case, the Hale case, and Williams v. 
Standard quoted supra. All require an interest in the 
publisher, the interest being a protection of pecuniary 
rights in the first two cases and the express statutory 
interest given to newspap·ers by our legislature with re-
spect to the protection of .a public interest in the latter 
case. 
Further, we contend, in reading the Court's instruc-
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tions as a whole, that the unwarranted repetition of the 
words "actual malice" and the requirement of finding 
of "actual malice," together with the Court's Instruction 
No. 9 defining actual malice as "hate, spite or ill \Vill," 
outside of the publication alleged to be lihelo-l_,s, con-
stituted a directed verdict against the plaintiff and wrong-
fully deprived him of a remeay for a grievous and un-
warranted injury arising from the arbitrary and inten-
tional act of the defendant. 
The Supreme Court of Washington recognized the 
need for such remedy when it stated in Smitlz v. Driscoll, 
(Sup. Ct. Wash., Jan. 30, 1917) 162 P. 572: 
"A complaint stating facts entitling plaintiff 
to recover for breach by a physician of the confi-
dential relation with his patient is not invalid, 
though it· improperly designates the action as 
slander." 
Pleading, Key No. 49. 
Physicians & Surgeons, Key 12, 18 ( ±) and see 
15(9) 
" ( P. 572) Neither is it necessary to pursue 
at length the inquiry of "\Yhether a cause of action 
lies in favor of a patient against a physician for 
wrongfully divulging confidential counnunirations. 
For the purposes of "~hat "\Ye shall say it "\Yill be 
assmned that, for so palpable a "\Yrong~ the la\Y 
provides a ren1edy. 
Respectfully subn1itted, 
McCARTY & HATCH 
by SlTl\fNER J. 1-I~\_TCH 
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